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I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA)1 focuses on consumer harm brought about through deception.2
This article covers significant developments under the DTPA during the
Survey period, December 1, 2016, through November 31, 2017.
Some of the salient changes to the DTPA came through statutory addi-
tions inserted by the 85th Texas Legislature during the Summer 2017 ses-
sion, which added to the DTPA’s laundry list of violative acts and also
* B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas A&M University School of Law; Associ-
ate, Pulman, Cappuccio, Pullen, Benson & Jones, LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
1. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–44, 17.461, 17.47–.48, 17.50–.63 (West
2011), §§ 17.45–.46,17.462–.463, 17.49 (West Supp. 2017). Section 17.50 of the DTPA
provides:
A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a
producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish:
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive
act or practice that is:
(A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsection (b) of Section
17.46 of this subchapter; and
(B) relied on by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment;
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of
Chapter 541, Insurance Code.
2. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (West 2011); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE
ANN. § 17.50 (West 2011); Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Roy B. Taylor
Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994).
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amended the Texas Insurance Code such that related DTPA claims may
be more easily removed to federal court. Also, case law developments
have, among other things, revealed that certain DTPA fraud claims might
be barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine while others may be
fatally defective because they lack an enforceable contract as a predicate.
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES–CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
A. STATUTORY CHANGES BY THE 85TH LEGISLATURE
1. Texas Business & Commerce Code § 17.46
The Texas Legislature added two provisions during the 2017 legislative
session to the so-called laundry list of acts constituting deceptive trade
practices.3 Both new provisions took effect on September 1, 2017.
The first addresses representations regarding licensure of a “massage
establishment.” The new provision expands the laundry list of proscribed
deceptive practices to include
owning, operating, maintaining, or advertising a massage establish-
ment, as defined by Section 455.001, Occupations Code, that:
(A) is not appropriately licensed under Chapter 455, Occupations
Code, or is not in compliance with the applicable licensing
and other requirements of that chapter; or
(B) is not in compliance with an applicable local ordinance relat-
ing to the licensing or regulation of massage establishments.4
The new designation comes as part of lawmakers’ broader statewide
efforts to address “[c]oncerns . . . that human trafficking and compelled
prostitution are prevalent in Texas and may take place at businesses
presenting themselves as massage establishments.”5 Thus, prostitution
parlors masquerading as spas may find themselves confronting new civil
liabilities. But, considering that at least some “consumers” of these ser-
vices might not want to out themselves as such through publicly filed law-
suits and that those who inadvertently patronize unlicensed masseuses
might have trouble establishing much by way of damages,6 it appears that
lawmakers were focused primarily on affording the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral a statutory vehicle rather than creating a private cause of action for
the Texas public.
3. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(33) (West Supp. 2017). Lawmakers
appear to have overlooked a scrivener’s error in the amended statute by actually adding
two provisions to subsection 17.46(b), both designated as 17.46(b)(33).
4. Id.
5. House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2552,
85th Leg., R.S. (2017); see also S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2552,
85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (citing “[a] recent report by The University of Texas at Austin’s
Institute on Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault,” which concluded “that there are over
300,000 victims of human trafficking in Texas,” making Texas second only to California in
the prevalence of such illicit practices).
6. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (West 2011) (requiring economic
damages or mental anguish as an element of a DTPA claim).
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The second addition to the laundry list proscribes the marketing of ve-
hicle warranties using terms typically associated with insurance products.7
Specifically, the new subsection provides that deceptive practices include
“a warrantor of a vehicle protection product warranty using, in connec-
tion with the product, a name that includes ‘casualty,’ ‘surety,’ ‘insur-
ance,’ ‘mutual,’ or any other word descriptive of an insurance business,
including property or casualty insurance, or a surety business.”8
The law takes aim at practices that conflate, in the minds of consumers,
vehicle warranties with car insurance. Lawmakers also intended this lan-
guage to prohibit vehicle dealers from requiring consumers to purchase
after-market products and warranties (beyond those offered by manufac-
turers).9 The new prohibition actually stemmed from a general deregula-
tion of the vehicle warranty industry in Texas.10 Lawmakers appear to
have included the new item on the laundry list to safeguard consumers in
the absence of state oversight.
2. Texas Insurance Code § 542A
The Texas Legislature also amended the Texas Insurance Code (Code)
to include a number of new procedural and substantive provisions that
amount to what might be considered insurance-related tort reform.11 Be-
cause claims for violations of the Code often go hand-in-hand with claims
for DTPA violations,12 one of the Code’s new provisions in particular
could significantly increase the number of DTPA claims that qualify for
removal to federal court, where they can be subjected to a host of early-
stage dispositive motions not available in state court and where the venue
is generally less favorable to plaintiffs.
That relevant new Code provision, effective beginning September 1,
2017, affords insurance carriers that are sued for allegedly deceptive in-
surance practices—which is simultaneously actionable under the DTPA—
an option to assume agents’ (including adjusters)13 liability as their
own.14 If a carrier assumes an agent’s liability, trial courts must dismiss
any factually related cause of action against the individual agent and per-
mit only the claims against the insurer itself to proceed.15
Tactically, this is potentially game-changing for the DTPA/insurance
7. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(33) (West Supp. 2017).
8. Id. Accompanying this addition to the laundry list is an expansion of the DTPA’s
definitional section to include the terms “vehicle protection product,” “warrantor,” and
“loss of or damage to the vehicle” (as the latter is used in the preceding definitions). See
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(14)–(16) (West Supp. 2017).
9. S. Comm. on Licensing & Admin. Procedures, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 2065, 85th
Leg., R.S. (2017).
10. See S. Comm. on Licensing & Admin. Procedures, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 2065,
85th Leg., R.S. (2017).
11. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542(A) (West Supp. 2017).
12. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (West 2011).
13. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542A.001(1) (West Supp. 2017) (“‘Agent’ means an em-
ployee, agent, representative, or adjuster who performs any act on behalf of an insurer.”).
14. See id. § 542A.
15. See id. § 542A.006.
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defense bar.16 It restores insurance carriers’ access to federal courts by
allowing them to elect not to have diversity-defeating Texas residents as
co-defendants. Because a carrier’s election to assume the agent’s liability
negates all claims against the individual, the agent’s dismissal is abso-
lute—i.e., it opens the door to removal of all claims, whether under the
Code or DTPA.
The timing of the new agent-election statute is particularly noteworthy
in light of the widespread property damage sustained by Texas’s coastal
residents during 2017’s active hurricane season. Federal courts should
brace themselves, and their dockets, for the coming wave of diversity-
based removals—and so, too, should the plaintiffs’ bar.
B. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
1. DTPA Claims as Ecclesiastical in Nature?
In Episcopal School, the Dallas Court of Appeals arguably broadened
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (Doctrine) to potentially bar DTPA
claims brought by students of religiously affiliated private schools to the
extent such claims even remotely “concern a faith-based organization’s
internal affairs, governance, administration, membership, or disciplinary
procedures and are protected religious decisions.”17
The Episcopal School plaintiff (John) was a student at a Dallas-area
private school whom the school expelled for leaving campus one after-
noon to allegedly smoke marijuana.18 John sued the school on a number
of causes of action, including a DTPA claim for alleged misrepresenta-
tions in a letter to parents by school officials that declared that “‘in most
cases, students should be given a chance to redeem themselves’ and that
‘we are not a zero tolerance school.’”19 The school filed a plea to the
jurisdiction with the trial court asserting that the ecclesiastical abstention
16. A review of just one year’s worth of DTPA-related cases illustrates just how often
DTPA defendants remove to federal court only to be bounced back to state court on a
motion to remand, which federal courts are wont to grant. See, e.g., Marminco III Family,
L.P. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., No. EP-17-CV-311-KC, 2017 WL 7797711, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 2017) (“Furthermore, to the extent that this Court gives any weight to those cases
disagreeing with Linron, such a split in authority must be resolved in favor of remand
because, in the context of a motion to remand, ‘[a]ny ambiguities are construed against
removal and in favor of remand to state court.’”); Affordable Portable Structures, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1:16-CV-1267-RP, 2017 WL 2266903, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 23,
2017) (“As noted above, this Court must resolve all ambiguities of state law in favor of
remand.”); Winterrowd v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., No. 4:17-CV-00110-ALM-
CAN, 2017 WL 1370768, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2017), adopted by Winterrowd v. All-
state Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Col, No. 4:17-CV-110, 2017 WL 1355331 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13,
2017).
17. In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., No. 05-17-00493-CV, 2017 WL 4533800, at *9
(Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 11, 2017, orig. proceeding, no pet.).
18. John initially denied leaving campus at all, an assertion that was later belied by
security cameras. Id. at *2. John then denied smoking marijuana—which was substantiated
by an initial negative drug test—but his assertions were also later belied by a witness’s
testimony that John had, in fact, smoked marijuana, and revelations that John’s initial drug
test analyzed the urine of a different student. Id. John failed a subsequent drug test. Id.
19. Id.
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doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction over the dispute, which the
trial court denied.
On mandamus review, the court of appeals reversed and held that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction under the Doctrine because (1) the school
was a religious institution20 and (2) John’s lawsuit “derive[d] solely from
the calculus of the school’s internal policies and management of its inter-
nal affairs, all directed at the school’s decision regarding whether [John]
should be a member of the school community.”21
As explained by the court, the Doctrine has its roots in the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and it “precludes government action
that burdens the free exercise of religion ‘by encroaching on the church’s
ability to manage its internal affairs.’”22 The court of appeals also ac-
knowledged that the Doctrine “does not foreclose civil court subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over all disputes involving religious entities” and that
“[b]ecause churches, their congregations, and their hierarchies exist and
function within the civil community, they are amenable to rules governing
civil, contract, and property rights in appropriate circumstances.”23 The
court of appeals then framed the analysis as turning on “whether a partic-
ular dispute is ecclesiastical in nature or simply a civil dispute in which
church officials happen to be involved.”24 Thus, the Doctrine begs a two-
part, conjunctive inquiry: First, is the defendant a religious institution?
Second, if so, is the dispute ecclesiastical in nature?
On the first question, the court discussed the school’s governance struc-
ture and procedures for the internal resolution of disputes “regarding
spiritual instruction,” which were to be ultimately resolved through “ap-
peal to the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas.”25 The school also
conditioned enrollment on compliance with its code of conduct—which
noted that “everyone is created in the image of God” and requires that
students conduct themselves in a manner consistent with state laws “re-
lated to illegal drugs and underage drinking.”26 In light of all these facts
and despite John’s arguments to the contrary, the court found that the
school was a religious institution as contemplated by the first of the Doc-
20. This conclusion followed extensive discussion by the court of appeals. Id. at *6
(“The record thus leaves only one reasonable conclusion: the school’s purpose and mission
are religious. And that the school may not be an affiliate of or have a formal legal relation-
ship with a specific church does not undermine the factual conclusion that it is a faith-
based institution.”). Because such a finding—though suspect—did not involve DTPA-spe-
cific inquiries, this article presumes for present purposes that that the school was properly
deemed a religious institution. As previously discussed, Episcopal School invokes DTPA-
only issues to the extent that John’s misrepresentation allegations were deemed ecclesiasti-
cal in nature.
21. Id. at *8.
22. Id. at *3 (quoting Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007)).
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *5.
26. Id.
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trine’s inquiries.27
The court likewise held that the nature of John’s dispute was ultimately
ecclesiastical in nature.28 The crux of the court’s reasoning on this point
was the precise way in which John brought his claims—chiefly, that the
alleged DTPA misrepresentations arose from the school’s “maintain[ing]
secret or alternative policies and procedures related to discipline.”29 The
Dallas Court of Appeals noted that, although “the dispute does not ex-
pressly concern religious doctrine in all respects,” it could not resolve the
claims (including DTPA fraud) without “pass[ing] judgment on the
school’s internal affairs and governance.”30 In finding that the dispute
required a religious inquiry, the court attempted, unconvincingly, to dis-
tinguish John’s facts from those of Tilton v. Marshall.31
In Tilton, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Doctrine did not ap-
ply to fraud claims against a televangelist who falsely represented that he
would “perform certain concrete acts” of “personally reading, touching,
and praying over [viewers’] prayer requests.”32 The Texas Supreme Court
declined to apply the Doctrine because a factfinder would not need to
delve into the truth or falsity of a religious representation (e.g., “Your
prayers will be answered.”) and would instead only need to contend with
“concrete acts” and determine whether the televangelist “had no inten-
tion of personally reading, touching, and praying over their prayer re-
quests at the time he said he would do so.”33 The supreme court did find,
however, that the Doctrine did bar fraud claims based on the televange-
lists sincerity when he told viewers that sending $100 would satisfy bibli-
cal tithing mandates.34 Adjudicating those claims, the supreme court held,
would improperly assess the veracity of the televangelist’s statements of
biblical meaning, so the supreme court fractured those claims and dis-
missed them for lack of secular jurisdiction.35
27. Id. at *6 (“[T]hat the school may not be an affiliate of or have a formal legal
relationship with a specific church does not undermine the factual conclusion that it is a
faith-based institution.”).
28. Id. at *9.
29. Id.
30. Id. In so concluding, the court distinguished Shannon v. Memorial Drive Presbyte-
rian Church, 476 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) and
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677–79 (Tex. 1996). Id. at *8. Shannon was inapposite
because it “involved a former employee’s tort and breach of contract suit against a church
arising out of a breach of a settlement agreement containing a non-disparagement clause.”
Id. Tilton was distinguishable because it involved television viewers’ claims for “fraud, con-
spiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress regarding ‘prayer cloths’ [the defen-
dant] sold and promised to bless.” Id.
31. Id. at *8–9 (discussing Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677–79 (Tex. 1996)). The
court did cite two cases that, the court reasoned, do support its holding. See, e.g., In re St.
Thomas High School, 495 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
granted); In re Vida, No. 04-14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Jan. 7, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
32. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 679.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 685.
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In Episcopal School, the court of appeals held that Tilton was inappli-
cable because John’s claims—unlike those alleged against the televange-
list—all related to a “faith-based organization’s internal affairs,
governance, administration, membership, or disciplinary procedures,”
which were “protected religious decisions.”36 Because John’s claims pur-
portedly “ha[d] no secular aspect for the courts to consider,” the court
held that Tilton-esque claim fracturing was unnecessary.37
The court’s refusal to fracture John’s DTPA claim was arguably a mis-
application of Tilton because John’s claim did arguably have strictly secu-
lar questions relating to concrete acts and representations. While perhaps
true that the John’s contract claims would likely require an inquiry into
whether skipping school and smoking pot breaches an agreement to be-
have “in the image of God,”38 the same is not true of an inquiry into
whether the school was sincere when it told prospective enrollees that
“we are not a zero tolerance school.”39 John alleged that the school mis-
represented to him that it would not take certain acts (not expel) if he
was ever found to have violated the code of conduct and further alleged
that the school did exactly that after accusing him of violating the code of
conduct for the first time.40 This is no different than the concrete acts
promised by the televangelist in Tilton that the Texas Supreme Court
held could be the basis of a fraud claim subject to secular court
jurisdiction.41
More generally, the Episcopal School holding casts doubt on whether
the Doctrine truly is circumscribed to ensure that religious institutions
are not exempt from “rules governing civil, contract, and property rights
in appropriate circumstances.”42 The Episcopal School court seemed con-
tent to bundle up all of John’s claims—which ranged from DTPA to negli-
gent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty—and disposed of all
without parsing in detail the legal and factual nuances attendant to DTPA
36. Episcopal School, 2017 WL 4533800, at *9.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *5. Arguably, even that would not require a judicial review of dogma. As the
Episcopal School itself pointed out, the school’s code of conduct actually incorporates sec-
ular laws on drug use and alcohol consumption, the interpretation of which unquestionably
falling within the constitutional purview of civil courts. These appear to be the very provi-
sions in the code of conduct that John was accused of violating.
39. Id. at *2. More problematic is the allegedly deceptive letter’s language that, “in
most cases,” violators would be given a chance to “redeem themselves.” Id. Whether John
should have been given a chance to redeem himself might have been an ecclesiastical ques-
tion, but the alleged misrepresentation that “we are not a zero tolerance school” appears
to have been a standalone, unqualified affirmative representation. See id. (“The school sent
upper school parents, including John Doe, a letter stating among other things ‘that in most
cases, students should be given a chance to redeem themselves’ and that ‘we are not a zero
tolerance school.’”).
40. Id. (“The lawsuit complains about [the school’s] disciplinary actions and the appli-
cation of the school’s policies and procedures.”) (emphasis added). Obviously, John would
have other hurdles to a finding of fraud—to wit, that the subsequent cover-up of the first
strike involved a series of additional strikes, meaning the school did not actually violate its
concrete not-zero-tolerance policy by the time it expelled John.
41. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 679 (Tex. 1996).
42. See Episcopal School, 2017 WL 4533800, at *4.
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fraud claims that did not apply to others. If, as the Tilton court explained,
the Doctrine requires more of a scalpel than a machete, the Episcopal
School case demonstrates that courts nevertheless seem quick to wield
the latter.
Furthermore, the court’s analysis of John’s claims neglected the policy
aims of the DTPA, which is to protect all consumers from hucksters,43
and such protections are in place regardless of whether such salesmen
cloak themselves in literal or figurative religious garb.44 After all, Texas
law has made clear that all consumers have rights, and courts do not need
to consult the Bible (or Quran or Torah or other religious text) to deter-
mine whether those rights have been violated.
2. Misrepresentations Related to a Contract
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals has now suggested that cer-
tain misleading remarks related to a vehicle trade-in prior to a new vehi-
cle purchase are not “misrepresentation[s]” under Section 17.46(b)(12) of
the DTPA, which prohibits “represent[ions] that an agreement confers or
involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or in-
volve,” in the absence of an underlying contract.45
The Lindsey plaintiff (Lindsey) was a construction firm that leased
three trucks from Enterprise.46 Toward the end of the lease term, one of
the trucks (Ram) began making a “clicking noise.”47 Lindsey brought the
Ram to an auto dealer/service provider (AutoNation). AutoNation in-
formed Lindsey that the Ram’s engine was broken and would need either
a complete rebuild or replacement.48 When Lindsey “arrived to retrieve
the [disassembled] Ram,” AutoNation proposed that Lindsey consider
trading in the Ram and the other two trucks for three new vehicles out of
AutoNation’s inventory.49 AutoNation’s subsequent appraisal of the Ram
43. This is not to say that the ultimate outcome in Episcopal School was incorrect. Nor
is it to say that the school in that case had, in fact, acted wrongly. Instead, this article
simply asserts that ecclesiastical (i.e., jurisdictional) dismissal should not have been the
procedural vehicle for disposition of John’s DTPA claims. The underlying merits appear to
have been textbook summary judgment material.
44. See Star Houston, Inc. v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ) (“The purpose of the DTPA is the protection of consumers from
deceptive trade practices, and the act is to be liberally construed to achieve this underlying
goal.”); see also State v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 602, 614 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2014, no pet.) (noting that constitutional protections do not bar states from placing “re-
straint on commercial speech necessary to protect the public.”); AEP Tex. Comm. & Indus.
Retail Ltd. P’ship v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 436 S.W.3d 890, 924 (Tex. App.—Austin
2014, no pet.) (“[T]here is no value to consumers or society for misleading or deceptive
commercial speech.”).
45. Lindsey Constr., Inc. v. AutoNation Fin. Servs., LLC, 541 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b)(12) (West 2011) (“[T]he term ‘false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices’
includes . . . representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obliga-
tions which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law . . . .”).
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valued it at $13,500—but the appraisal did not state whether that value
reflected the defective engine or instead assessed Ram’s value with a re-
built or replaced engine.50 Importantly, the truck appraisals themselves
did not reference any proposed new sale agreement related to the trucks’
trade-in value.51 Allegedly based on AutoNation’s appraisal value of the
Ram (and uncontroversial appraisal of the other two trucks), Lindsey
agreed to the deal and purchased (via a new lease agreement with Enter-
prise) three trucks from AutoNation. Shortly after accepting the new
trucks, Lindsey received notice from Enterprise that AutoNation had re-
fused to accept the still-broken Ram as a trade-in and that, consequently,
the lease payments for the Ram’s replacement would be higher than
Lindsey expected.52
Lindsey brought DTPA claims against AutoNation after AutoNation
flatly refused to accept the broken Ram as a trade-in valued at $13,500.
Lindsey’s claim rested on the premise that, in violation of Section
17.46(b)(12), AutoNation failed to disclose that the trade-in agreement
was conditioned on the replacement or rebuild of the Ram’s engine. The
trial court rendered no-evidence summary judgment in favor of AutoNa-
tion on multiple grounds, implicitly finding that Lindsey failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to support the existence of an enforceable agreement
between Lindsey and AutoNation where the parties mutually assented to
AutoNation’s purchase of the Ram for $13,500.53 Accordingly, the trial
court held (again, implicitly, due to the trial court’s silence on the specific
grounds) that Lindsey failed to raise any issues of fact with respect to an
alleged misrepresentation about the terms or conditions of such an
agreement.54
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the record
contained no evidence as to the mutual-assent prerequisite of a contract
and, thus, no evidence of a misrepresentation as to the terms of that al-
leged contract.55 The Lindsey court noted, after pointing out that Lindsey
cited no authority for the proposition that a failure to disclose could con-
stitute a deceptive act under Section 17.46(b)(12), that it would presume
that a failure to disclose could amount to a misrepresentation.56 Never-
theless, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Lindsey’s applicable
DTPA claim failed for want of an underlying contract, which the court
reasoned was essentially a prerequisite to a claim under Section
17.46(b)(12).57
50. Id. at 358–59.
51. Id. at 359.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 362.
54. Id. at 365.
55. Id. at 363–64.
56. Id. at 365.
57. Id. The court also held that Lindsey’s claims for violations of DTPA Section
17.46(b)(14)—relating to misrepresentations regarding the authority of an “agent to nego-
tiate the final terms of a consumer transaction”—failed based on Lindsey’s inability to
adduce relevant evidence. Id.
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Lindsey illustrates the importance of pleading the correct items from
the DTPA’s so-called “laundry list” when bringing a claim for misrepre-
sentation because courts do not always construe the DTPA as broadly as
perhaps they should.58 The Lindsey record certainly appears to have con-
tained adequate allegations that some sort of misrepresentation had oc-
curred. If nothing else, the Ram’s appraisal itself was sufficiently
misleading to support a DTPA claim.59 Lindsey was quite arguably
deceived during its discussions with AutoNation, which gave Lindsey the
reasonable impression that it would accept the Ram at a trade-in value of
$13,500 despite major engine defects that were diagnosed by AutoNation
and specifically discussed by the parties. Then, once the deal was done
and Lindsey was locked into a new lease with Enterprise, AutoNation
allegedly made an about-face and flatly refused to accept the Ram as a
trade-in.
There is deception there, and that deception is actionable. But Lindsey
apparently erred by alleging deception predicated on a valid contract
when it could have made a standalone allegation based on the misleading
appraisal.
What were Lindsey’s alternatives? Perhaps the DTPA claims would
have survived summary judgment had Lindsey alleged that AutoNation’s
opaque appraisal was a “false or misleading statement[ ] of fact concern-
ing the reasons for, existence of, or amount of price reductions” with re-
spect to the new trucks.60 Lindsey’s claims might have also fallen under
the DTPA’s prohibition against “failing to disclose information concern-
ing goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if
such failure to disclose such information was intended to induce the con-
sumer into a transaction into which the consumer would not have entered
had the information been disclosed.”61 Lindsey might have also used the
more general prohibition under Section 17.50(a)(3) against “any uncon-
scionable action or course of action by any person.”62
58. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (West 2011) (“This subchapter shall
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect
consumers . . .”); see also Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Tex. 1980) (“A
broad interpretation is warranted, however, due to human inventiveness in engaging in
deceptive or misleading conduct.”).
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Hennessey & Associates, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (discussing DTPA claims against a real property appraiser for
misrepresenting square footage and affirming summary judgment against homeowner on
causation grounds only).
60. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(11) (West 2011); but see Washburn
v. Sterling McCall Ford, 521 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no
pet.) (construing § 17.46(b)(11) somewhat narrowly and holding that “[m]ost of the abuses
in this area deal with conveying the false impression in an effort to promote products and
services that the seller is bankrupt, liquidating its inventory, going out of business, or losing
its lease”).
61. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(24) (West 2011). Had Lindsey
brought its claim under this section, it would have also avoided any legal uncertainty as to
whether a failure to disclose could have violated the applicable provision—as mentioned
by the court of appeals.
62. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (West 2011). Such an unconscio-
nability claim would have instead turned on the question of whether AutoNation, “to
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Thus, as is often the moral of these DTPA cases, pleading DTPA claims
under precisely the right statutory provision is key—and plaintiffs should
not treat DTPA claims as afterthought, catchall causes of action.
3. Consumer Status Required for Tie-In Claims
In Hunt v. City of Diboll, the Tyler Court of Appeals has made it
clear—if it was ever in doubt—that DTPA claims under a tie-in statute
require consumer status like any other DTPA claim.63
The Hunt plaintiffs sued the City of Diboll and a company (ATS) that
Diboll had contracted with to install and operate a series of red light cam-
eras.64 The plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that ATS had violated
a DTPA tie-in statute that prohibits misrepresentations by private secur-
ity firms regarding their licensure under the Texas Occupations Code.65
ATS filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that the claims were im-
proper because the plaintiffs could not establish consumer status under
the DTPA.66 The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dis-
missed the DTPA claims.67
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal be-
cause, in part, claims brought under DTPA tie-in statutes do require con-
sumer status.68 The plaintiffs argued that Section 17.50(h) of the DTPA,
which provides that claimants under tie-in statutes may recover a differ-
ent variety of damages than those bringing straight DTPA claims, implies
that consumer status is likewise treated differently in the tie-in statute
[Lindsey’s] detriment, t[ook] advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or
capacity of [Lindsey] to a grossly unfair degree.” See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.45(5) (West 2011). Admittedly, the facts attendant to a new vehicle’s price offset for a
trade-in are not exactly an ideal match for an unconscionability claim. See, e.g., Lon Smith
& Associates, Inc. v. Key, 527 S.W.3d 604, 624 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. filed)
(noting that an unconscionability claim requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant
“took advantage of the consumer’s lack of knowledge and that the resulting unfairness was
glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete, and unmitigated”). It is not clear that Lindsey’s
damages related to the new vehicle purchase itself resulted from AutoNation taking advan-
tage of inferior knowledge, and instead appear to have flowed from plain old-fashioned
deception or, at best, obfuscation. But, taking the appraisal in isolation, Lindsey might be
said to have relied on AutoNation’s expertise when it comes to the valuation of trucks with
defective engines.
63. Hunt v. City of Diboll, No. 12-17-00001-CV, 2017 WL 7663041, at *16 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Nov. 8, 2017, pet. filed).
64. Id. at *2.
65. Id. at *15; see also TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.3835(a) (West 2012) (“A person
who performs or offers to perform an activity regulated under this chapter, but who is not
licensed or otherwise authorized under this chapter to perform the activity, commits a
false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of [the DTPA].”).
66. Hunt, 2017 WL 7663041, at *14.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *15 (citing Cushman v. GC Servs., L.P., 397 Fed. App’x 24, 27–28 (5th Cir.
2010); Deubler v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 07-13-00221-CV, 2015 WL 3750312, at *6
(Tex. App.—Amarillo June 15, 2015, pet. denied)).
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context.69 The court rejected that argument.70 While the court did not
delve much into the analysis of whether consumer status is required for
tie-in statute claims, it did approvingly cite to a U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit case that, after summarizing suggestive language from
various Texas cases, held that a DTPA tie-in claim does require consumer
status.71
Prior to Hunt, and certainly prior to the Amarillo Court of Appeal’s
decision in Deubler, only federal courts applying Texas law had addressed
whether DTPA claims through tie-in statutes required consumer status.
In light of Hunt, it now appears to be relatively established beyond a one-
off case out of Amarillo that Texas courts agree with their federal coun-
terparts—plaintiffs bringing claims under DTPA tie-in statutes must es-
tablish consumer status.
4. Misrepresentations Regarding “Background Checks”
In Ryan Construction Services, LLC v. Robert Half International, Inc.,
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that a representation that
one will conduct a “background check” on a prospective employee does
not imply or require an investigation into the potential employee’s crimi-
nal history.72 The plaintiff (Ryan) was an employer that had contracted
with a third-party (RHI) to recruit, place, and vet an accountant who
eventually embezzled $160,000 from Ryan.73 Prior to placing the account-
ant, an RHI employee represented to Ryan that it conducted “back-
ground checks” on all candidates.74 RHI also sent Ryan materials
detailing that “background check” meant checking references and did not
include such things as drug screenings, medical exams, and criminal back-
ground checks.75 After discovering the accountant’s embezzlement, Ryan
discovered that the accountant did have a relevant criminal history that
RHI did not uncover or disclose.76 Ryan sued RHI for, among other
things, violation of the laundry list prohibition against “representing that
goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have . . .”77
On appeal of the trial court’s summary judgment in RHI’s favor, the
court of appeals held that “[RHI’s] employee did not state that [RHI]
69. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(h) (West 2011) (“[I]f a claimant
is granted the right to bring a cause of action under this subchapter by another law, the
claimant is not limited to recovery of economic damages only, but may recover any actual
damages incurred by the claimant . . .”).
70. Hunt, 2017 WL 7663041, at *15.
71. Id. (quoting Cushman, 397 Fed. App’x at 27–28).
72. Ryan Constr. Servs., LLC v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 541 S.W.3d 294, 304 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
73. Id. at 298–99.
74. Id. at 302–03.
75. Id. at 298. RHI did later conduct a seven-year criminal history check, but for
DTPA purposes the representation at issue was the initial statement that the company
conducted “background checks.” See id. at 299.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (West 2011).
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would run a criminal background check, so the employee did not make a
misrepresentation about any contract or service benefit or about the
characteristics of [RHI]’s services.”78 The opinion does go on to note that
“[e]ven if as a general proposition the term ‘background check’ could
include checking criminal history, [RHI] set forth precisely what it meant
by the term” when it elaborated in subsequent materials that the vetting
would include only reference checks.79 The court therefore insinuated
that, even absent RHI’s disclosure of what “background check” actually
entailed, the representation would still not have been misleading.80
To the extent that the court held that a background check does not
imply a criminal history check for purposes of DTPA misrepresentations,
this holding is questionable.81 Setting aside the fact that RHI actually did
follow up on the representation with clarification of what “background
check” meant, one cannot fault Ryan for reasonably believing that the
professional human resources firm it was paying to vet potential employ-
ees was going to look into a candidate’s criminal history—particularly
when that human resources firm specializes in placing, of all things,
accountants.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the statutory DTPA changes that took effect in 2017 are not
exactly groundbreaking, changes to the closely-related Texas Insurance
Code could have a significant impact on where many DTPA cases are
tried going forward. Also, Texas courts made it clear in 2017 that the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine continues to be a valuable tool in the
DTPA defense context.
More generally speaking, despite lawmakers’ clear directives that Texas
courts construe the DTPA broadly in favor of consumers, several cases in
2017 illustrate that courts are increasingly keen on reading the DTPA’s
language narrowly and in favor of defendants when possible.
78. Ryan, 541 S.W.3d at 304.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 305.
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